Phi vụ bay đêm cảm tử

K.Q. Phan Văn Phúc K.65F

Biệt đội 219 chúng tôi được biệt phái tăng cường yểm bộ cho tuyến đầu lửa đạn đóng tại căn cứ không quân Phú Bài.

Sáng sớm chúng tôi nhận được lệnh chờ Thiếu tá Hảo phi đoàn phó từ Nha Trang ra đón đi nhân phi lệnh khẩn cấp. Bay ra Huế vào phòng họp của bộ tư lệnh tiền phương, tôi cảm thấy lạnh người vì không khí nghiêm trọng của buổi họp. Bay theo Thiếu tá Hảo có Trung úy Hiệp, người bạn phi hành cùng phi đoàn gốc từ binh chủng biệt động quân. Chưa kịp chào hỏi thì hai chúng tôi được chỉ định ngồi vào hàng ghế đầu nghe thuyết trình. Hai thằng Trung úy “nhí” như chúng tôi được ngồi cùng với bao vị tướng tá sao không khỏi mất bình tĩnh?

Trước khi ban lệnh hành quân, vị tư lệnh hành quân tiền phương kêu gọi tinh thần can đảm và hy sinh tuyệt đối của hai chúng tôi vì chuyến bay này lành ít, dữ nhiều. Bộ tổng tham mưu đã hoạch định nhiều kế hoạch nhưng đều khó thực hiện được, cuối cùng phải chọn giải pháp dùng trực thăng của phi đoàn 219 bay đêm thả người vào cổ thành Quảng Trị đã bị VC chiếm đóng từ lâu. Hai đứa chúng tôi được chọn vì một đứa từ binh chủng nhảy dù sang và một đứa từ binh chủng Biệt động quân sang.

Ít nhiều chúng tôi đã trải qua thời gian chiến đấu ở trận địa. “Các anh chỉ biết nhiệm vụ là thả người và rải máy truyền tin điện tử vào đáp cạnh cổ thành Quảng Trị không cần biết lý do. Rất có thể các anh sẽ bị bắn rơi trong phi vụ này vì hỏa lực phòng không của địch rất mạnh nhưng tôi hy vọng và tin tưởng vào tài năng và kinh nghiệm bay bổng của hai anh. Nếu chẳng may các anh bị bắn rơi, hãy giả làm người dân chạy loạn nên tôi yêu cầu các anh phải đổi mặc đồ thường phục cà tất cả giấy tờ tùy thân gởi lại cho đơn vị trưởng, nếu có mệnh hệ nào chính phủ se bảo bọc gia đình các anh sau này. Tôi kêu gọi tinh thần dũng cảm cà sẵn sàng hy sinh của các anh trong thời điểm quan trọng này.”

Nhận lệnh hành quân, tuyệt đối phải thi hành một phi vụ đầy nguy hiểm vì nhìn vào bản đồ hành quân từ sông Mỹ Chánh trở ra VC đã chiếm đóng toàn bộ và mạng lưới phòng không dày đặc khó mà bay lọt. Để vô hiệu hóa phòng không địch và đừng để cho chúng phát hiện kịp chỉ còn một phương cách duy nhất là chúng tôi phải bay đêm, tắt hết đèn và bay thật thấp, thật nhanh. Thật là một chuyến bay hoàn toàn mất cả an phi đầy mạo hiểm vì ban đêm tắt đèn dễ lạc nhau nếu bay xa, bay quá gần dễ chặt đuôi bạn và bay thấp dễ chặt cây. Nếu khống chế được những yếu tố trên thì địch chỉ nhìn theo mà chửi thề thôi.

Chúng tôi tin tưởng vào phương thức bay của mình chỉ ngại khi đáp lại vào đầu VC thì rất nguy hiểm. Trong phi vu này ông phi đoàn phó lại cất Hiệp bay đầu chở người và tôi bay chiếc thứ hai chở đầy máy truyền tin điện tử rải dọc tuyến đường bay từ Mỹ Chánh ra đến cổ thành và bay cover cho Hiệp lúc đáp. Tự ái nghề nghiệp lúc ấy đã khiến tôi có thái độ hơi bất mãn, ông phó nhận thấy và gọi nhỏ giải thích. Anh nên biết trong phi vu này chiếc đi sau mới là chiếc quan trọng đòi hỏi nhiều kinh nghiệm khó khăn hơn nhiều. Tôi tin tưởng và xin anh phải cố gắng bám thật sát Hiệp và yểm trợ anh ta tối đa trong mọi tình huống nhất là không bao giờ bỏ rơi bạn bè. Nghe qua lời nhắn nhủ của cấp chỉ huy đáng kính này, tôi cảm thấy mát lòng và hối hận, thương bạn nhiều hơn và tự hứa là sẵn sàng hy sinh theo bạn nếu gặp điều chẳng may trong đêm nay (một điều rất buồn là Hiệp lại bị rớt máy bay chết sau đó vài tháng).

Chúng tôi tính độ dạt của gió, tốc độ, hướng bay và thời gian rồi kẻ phóng đồ phi vụ chờ đêm đến sẽ cất cánh tại phi trường Tây Lộc (Huế) bay thẳng ra Hương Điền (Bộ chỉ huy sư đoàn TQLC) rồi chuyển hướng bay thẳng ra cổ thành Quảng Trị, bãi đáp là một nghĩa trang cạnh cổ thành. Chúng tôi phải ra phố mua sắm đồ thường phục dạo quanh phố như một toán cao bồi Texas trước sự ngạc nhiên của mọi người. Riêng tôi phải gọi về Đà Nẵng mang ra áo lưới phi hành mà tôi luôn trang bị đầy đủ dụng cụ mưu sinh thoát hiểm nhất là khẩu Browing nhỏ và rất nhiều lựu đạn mini. Sở dĩ tôi rất cần và thích lựu đạn vì một lần tôi đã thoát chết nhờ có lựu đạn khi còn ở đơn vị tiểu đoàn 9 nhảy dù. Vào năm 1968, tiểu đoàn đang đóng quân ở chiến trường Tây Ninh, ông Thiếu tá Nguyễn Đình Bảo, tiểu đoàn phó cắt đại đội 91 ra ái ngữ để đón đại đội 92 đang di chuyển về phải qua một khoảng đất trống rất nguy hiểm. Tôi và anh mang máy cùng hai đệ tử nằm dưới một hố bom B52 hướng về bìa rừng đối diện chờ quân bạn lúc trời sẩm tối. Tôi nghe máy báo là thằng 2 sắp ra (Đại đội 92), tôi thấy một toán lính đi ra nhưng lại không đội mũ sắt, tôi gọi hỏi Đại úy Trương Đưỡng (Đại đội trưởng 91) ông gọi qua 92 để khiển trách nhưng không ngờ đó là VC, chúng mặc áo là quân bạn cứ để chúng tôi tiến về gần nhưng gần đến nơi chúng bắt đầu khai hỏa. Chúng ra từ giữa đồng trống bất thần khai hỏa loạn xạ vào chúng tôi bất thần trở tay không kịp. May là tôi nằm dưới hố bom chúng chẳng thấy chỉ bắn qua đầu tôi gây rất nhiều thương tích cho bộ chỉ huy đại đội phía sau. Tôi vẹt cỏ tranh nhìn thấy chúng dàn hàng ngang súng bắn miệng ho to “hàng sống, chống chết”. Tôi báo tất cả 4 tên rút tất cả lựu đạn chia hướng chờ tôi ra lệnh đồng quăng một lượt khi VC chỉ còn cách 10m. Loạt lựu đạn nổ chúng tôi chạy bán sống bán chết ban đêm lại thất lạc máy lại bị VC đuổi theo, lính mình bị thương súng ống bỏ đầy đường rút lui, mãi gần sáng tôi mới về tới bộ chỉ huy tiểu đoàn được. Nếu không nhờ loạt lựu đạn đó có lẽ tôi đã bị VC dập lên đầu bắn tan xác rồi, âu cũng là một kinh nghiệm đau thương.

Trở lại phi vụ bay đêm, chuẩn bị phi hành đoàn và các thứ, chúng tôi mỗi người một tâm trạng, Hiệp hình như có một tâm trạng đau buồn nào đó nên lúc nào cũng lầm lì ít nói. Tôi chọn được Hoành làm hoa tiêu phó và Định làm cơ phi, hai phi hành viên trong phi đoàn mà tôi rất mến. Thiếu úy Dương Văn Hoành đã là một hoa tiêu chánh, một hoa tiêu ưu tú về mọi phương diện, lúc nào cũng bình tĩnh coi mọi chuyện như pha, Hoành sẽ giúp tôi được an tâm phần nào. Cũng đặc biệt là Hoành lại bị rơi máy bay chết cháy cả 7 người chỉ còn Hoành sống sót thật là một chuyện thần kỳ. Trung sĩ Định cơ phi rất lanh lẹ và gan lì, chúng tôi thường rủ nhau bay chung phi hành đoàn cũng như Lương Ngọc Ánh đang ở Houston với Dương Văn Hoành hiện giờ.

Đêm về, giờ quyết tử đã đến, chúng tối sẵn sàng cất cánh. Trong ánh sáng lờ mờ của phi trường Tây Lộc xuất hiện một đoàn xe có hộ tống một xe bít bùng chạy thẳng đến phi cơ của Hiệp 4 Lôi Hổ dìu 2 tên bị bịt mắt lên phi cơ, 2 tên này mặc quân phục y như Việt cộng, mang ba lô và súng AK đầy đủ. Phi cơ tôi được chất lên đầy máy truyền tin điện tử. Nhìn 2 tên VC tôi vô cùng kinh ngạc, suốt ngày nay tôi đã cố đánh tan mọi sự nguy hiểm sắp xảy ra bằng một quyết tâm sẵn sàng phục vụ cho đại cuộc vì nghĩ rằng có lẽ mình cũng thực hiện một điệp vụ tối mật nào đó để chuẩn bị tái chiếm cổ thành nhưng lại tiếp tay “thả cọp về rừng” hay sao? “Điều này càng chứng minh rõ ràng hơn khi phi cơ dắt 2 tên VC này chẳng chịu xuống phải nhờ 4 lôi hổ tống đạp khỏi phi cơ trong khi tiếng súng bắn ra như mưa”.

Mọi thắc mắc đang còn dồn dập thì chúng tôi phải ồ ạt cất cánh tìm đủ mọi cách tránh né tử thần. Chúng tôi bay trong bóng đêm, lướt qua đầu địch bất ngờ, chúng trở tay chẳng kip, chỉ bắn đuổi theo đạn lửa đầy trời phía sau. Đúng hướng, đúng giờ ấn định, Thiếu úy Hoành báo lệnh đáp, Hiệp quẹo gắt đáp khẩn cấp, tôi bay vòng trên đầu yểm trợ, đạn địch lẻ tẻ bắn vài nơi bên cạnh, tôi ra lệnh 4 khẩu đại liên cùng khai hỏa nhưng cẩn thận nhìn phi cơ bạn vì trời tối đen khó quan sát lại không được mở đèn. Khổ nỗi là 2 tên VC lại cứ đeo sát hai cây chống của phi cơ chẳng chịu xuống, tôi chỉ cho lệnh đạp xuống càng nhanh càng tốt, rất tiếc là chẳng dám cho lệnh bắn bỏ lúc bấy giờ, lúc này thì khác. Bỏ xong hai cục nợ, tôi bay vòng bắn yểm trợ cho Hiệp cất cánh. Lúc này cao độ bay về sao thấy phi cơ mình bay chậm hơn bao giờ hết. Về đáp lại phi trường Tây Lộc, chúng tôi cảm thấy như vừa chết đi sống lại. Phi trường lúc ấy đầy người bù lại lúc nãy trong vùng địch mình cảm thấy cô đơn lẽ loi quá, nếu chẳng may bị bắn rơi chắc là chẳng một ai dám bay ra tiếp cứu mình lúc ấy cả.

Qua hai sự kiện rõ ràng, chỉ vì 2 tên VC mà cả bộ tổng tham mưu, tướng vùng đích thân chỉ huy và sẵn sàng hy sinh bao nhiêu sinh mạng của nhân viên phi hành như thế sao?

Có những điều oan trái mà rất nhiều người lính thấp hèn như chúng tôi phải gánh chịu. Nhưng trong phi vụ này mãi đến bay giờ tôi vẫn chưa được giải thích rõ ràng. Phải chăng có sự lừa đảo hay có một sự đi đêm nào đó của bàn tay lông lá nào mà nỗi buồn nhược tiểu của đất nước chúng ta phải gánh chịu. Lịch sử đã cho chúng ta thấy đất nước mình đã bị bán đứng quá rõ ràng và quá tàn nhẫn. Rất nhiều quân nhân trong chúng ta có thừa can đảm và sẵn sàng hy sinh cho tổ quốc, nhưng cũng có những lần hy sinh vô nghĩa tác hại lại sự chiến đấu sồng còn của cả một dân tộc.

Cầu xin những ai có thẩm quyền hãy giải thích tường tận cho riêng tôi khỏi còn phải “ân hận” hoặc phải “oán hận” trước khi nhắm mắt . Chân thành cám ơn.

Trong hai phi hành đoàn này vì lâu quá tôi không nhớ hết những ai trong 8 người. Tôi chỉ biết Hiệp đã chết và Định hình như đã chết sau này. Riêng Hoành cũng đã ở tù đi HO sang định cư tại Houston. Xin còn những ai biết rõ hơn mọi chi tiết báo cho tôi được biết, rất cám ơn.

                                                   Dallas, 2-12-2010

                                                   Kingbee Phan Văn Phúc.

   ANH PHÚC ƠI ! MẪN ĐÂY ANH KHỎE KHÔNG...THẾ LÀ TỪ NAY ANH EM MÌNH CÓ DỊP TÂM SỰ CÙNG NHAU RỒI NHÉ

    GỬI ANH BÀI VIẾT NÀY... TR/S NGUYỄN ĐỊNH QUÊ Ở NHA TRANG ...ĐỊNH ĐÃ CHÊT SAU 75.

             MINH MẪN

Ðầu năm 1972   Tôi nhớ có một lần biết phái ra Huế , ở tại một căn cứ tạm của Lực Lượng đặc Biệt , nơi này từ cầu TRƯỜNG TIỀN đi xuống  rẽ trái là Khách Sạn Hương Giang,  đi thẳng  500 mét rẽ trái , căn cứ năm gần góc đường phía bên phải , trước kia la khu nội trú Sinh viên , sau trở thành doanh trại Quân cảnh Tư Pháp , rồi  nhường  lại cho LLÐB ở tạm , trong thời gian chờ giải thể . Chúng tôi có Bốn chiếc , hai Phi Hành Ðoàn thay phiên nhau , hôm nay đi ngày mai nghỉ , chỉ có một phi vụ mà xuốt 5 -  6 ngày chưa hoàn thành , Nhiệm vụ thả hai BK  mặc thường phục , không trang bị vũ khí , họ nhẩy xuống Cam Lộ , tất cả PHÐ cũng đều phải mặc thường phục màu sậm , để lại địa chỉ cấp báo , và cứ đến chiều tối mới xuất phát , Tôi bay chung với Anh Tr/u  Hiệp  và Th/u nguyễn văn  Tiều , cứ đến  chiều  là bay lên Tây Lộc Standing by,  cho đến  sau  19 giờ là cất cánh , Th/t Tống Phước Hảo và một Tr/T Hoa kỳ đến bắt tay trước khi khởi hành , bay một đoạn , máy bay hỏng vô tuyến phải quay về , ngày hôm sau  hai chiếc khác  , ban ngày Kỹ thuật sửa chữa  tối là làm việc , không hiểu sao cứ chiều Tối,  Máy bay không hỏng cái này,  cũng hòng cái  khác , càng kéo dài nhiều ngày càng mệt , bản thân Tôi cũng thấy mệt mỏi, ban ngày thì nóng , cơm thì khô , thật khó nuốt , lúc nào cũng thấy như không muốn ăn cái gì cả, cứ như no hơi , và một buổi tối tôi năm cạnh Tr/u  Hiệp tôi nghe Anh thở dài , không biết là anh mơ hay tỉnh,  Anh nói “ Thôi thì Cố Ðại Uùy cũng phải ráng , cứ như thế này thì không thể nào chịu nổi ròi “ .
     Qua ngày hôm sau , Tr/u  Hiệp quyết định làm cho xong , dù máy bay có hư hỏng cũng phải cố gắng , đúng 19 giờ 30 chúng Tôi cất cánh , Anh chấm tọa độ và định thời gian từ Tây lộc đến LZ  thời gian bay bao lâu , Anh tắt tất cả Rotortinglight ,  lấy cấp trực chỉ bay thẳng đến LZ , Ðến nơi , Anh yêu cầu chiếc thứ nhì bay lên cao , Anh Descends xuống  , thấy đất  mờ mờ Anh lập tức bật Landinglight  ,  đáp ngay xuống , đây là một nơi rất quen, nó là  một nghĩa trang , ở dưới địch quân đặt sẵn súng cối , đại bác  phòng không rất nhiều , bất ngờ địch quân chạy tán loạn , hai BK quân  lao xuông  chạy mất dạng , Tr/u Hiệp cất cánh ,tắt hết đèn , bay low leval một đoạn rồi mới mông  tê lên cao , khi về đến nhà , Anh Hảo và trưởng trại ra ôm chúng tôi mừng rỡ, mission đã được hoàn thành.Lần này Tôi được một huy chương Phi Dũng bội Tinh  cánh chim đồng  theo QÐ số  001/SÐ I KQ ngày 23 tháng 02 năm 1972.Và cũng  vào ngày 01 tháng 01 năm 1972 Tôi được lên TRUNG SĨ NHẤT  theo QÐ số 02420/TTM/KQ/NV/ TQT/TTHC/TT  ngày 08 tháng 02 năm 1972.

Viết thêm về Phi Vụ Bay Đêm Cảm Tử

Năm ngoái KingBee Phúc về Cali chơi có đến nhà KB Mạnh, hôm đó có KB Đường, Tuấn..tôi có nhắc đến phi vụ này và KB Phúc nói  Phúc cũng bay chiếc thứ 2  sau Tr/Uy Hiệp trong phi vụ này, tôi hơi ngạc nhiên, nay đọc thấy Tr/sĩ  Định viết rõ là phải 5,6 lần phi vụ mới hoàn tất.

 Tôi bay chiếc số 2 sau Tr/uy Hiệp say, Ngọc A là co-pilot, PHD tôi chỉ có 3 người, 2 pilots và 1 xạ thủ duy nhất là KB Nguyễn Thiện Trí, (Trí hiện ở Saigon). Tôi nhớ Trí mặc đồ civil, tay cầm cây rouleau quay như cowboy, cười giỡn rất vô tư, có lẽ lần đầu bay với đồ civil và cũng có lẽ vì còn rất trẻ không biết hiểm nguy đang chờ chực. Chi tiết giống như KB Phúc kể , tất cả mặc civil, giấy tờ để lại trên chiếc bàn gỗ nhỏ ngay trên bãi cỏ cạnh phi đạo nơi 2 chiếc UH1 đậu, có Th/Tá Hảo, 1 Tr/tá Mỹ, hình như có cả Th/tá Phố hiện diện tại PT Tây Lộc hôm đó để briefings anh em trước khi bay, tôi nhớ là đích thân Đ/tá Phước bay C&C cho phi vụ này trên một chiếc C47 cất cánh từ Đà Nẵng. 

Chập tối hôm đầu khi 2 chiếc bay qua sông Mỹ Chánh (từ sông Mỹ Chánh trở ra là vùng địch chiếm)  thì mưa tầm tã, chiếc tail rotor của Hiệp chao qua chao lại trước mặt tôi, đôi lúc mờ mịt không thấy gì, nguy hiểm vô cùng, tôi  phải báo cáo lên Đại Bàng zero visible vì mưa to, D/t Phuớc cho lệnh hủy bỏ phi vụ hôm sau sẽ làm lại. Làm lại thì làm lại, tôi chẳng lo lắng nhiều, có lẽ vì độc thân bất cần đời, riêng Hiệp thì lo ra mặt, đêm hôm đó Hiệp nhậu say,  sáng hôm sau Hiệp đánh telegram về cho vợ, đại ý ráng nuôi con nếu Hiệp phải hy sinh. Tôi với Hiệp cả ngày hôm đó la cà ở cư xá LLDB gần khách sạn Hương Giang đến 6g chiều mới vô pt Tây Lộc để tiếp tục phi vụ.

Chập tối  hôm đó trời có mây nhưng không mưa, theo briefings như hôm trước, phi vụ sẽ bay qua 3 checkpoints A, B và C.

Từ Mỹ Chánh bay thẳng về hướng Bắc 12 phút, tốc độ 80 knots đến checkpoint A là thôn Mỹ Thủy gần biển, tại đây sẽ thả vài cây antenne báo động (motion-detector sensors) , vùng này cát trắng tinh, bay low level , chiếc 2 bay cao hơn chiếc 1 chừng 50Ft, an toàn vì thấy rõ chiếc 1 in trên cát trắng. Trên đường đến check point B , trời tối hơn, cát trắng thưa thớt nên gay go bắt đầu khi tiếng đạn địch ân cần chào đón, Từ  Mỹ Thủy lấy hướng Tây bay 12 phút (80knots)  xéo lên hướng Bắc một chút (285o) để tránh TP Quảng Trị, băng ngang QL1, đến check point B ở phiá bắc Ái Tử, tại đây cũng thả vài cây sensors nữa, tiếng AK rất gần nổ dòn như pháo tết, sau đó bay đúng 12 phút nữa, khoảng giữa Ái Tử và Đông Lương để đến checkpoint C, đáp ở phía nam Cam Lộ giữa một nghĩa địa cát trắng để thả 2 VC xuống.  Khoảng 3 phút trước khi đáp điểm C, tầu tôi  bị hàng trăm khẩu AK bắn với theo, có lẽ bay ngang ổ kiến lửa ?, rất may chỉ dính 2 lỗ trên tail boom.

Vì 3 con số 12 phút trùng hợp này nên tôi nhớ mãi cho đến hôm nay. 

Phi vụ bắt buộc phải bay low level nên không thấy được các checkpoints, co-pilot phải check đồng hồ từng phút cho pilot bay, bay đúng phút và tốc độ đã định là đến checkpoints, bay chậm lại, thả sensors xuống rồi bay tiếp ngay đúng như chỉ dẫn trong briefings. 

Khi bay về lại Tây Lộc, trời tối hẳn, Hiệp và tôi chúi mũi phóng120 knots thẳng ra biển, lên 2000ft đã thấy đèn đuốc thành phố Huế rực sáng trước mặt.

Trong phi vụ này tôi bay chiếc số 2 có 2 ngày và KB Phúc cũng bay 2 ngày nên dù sao căng thẳng không kéo dài, riêng chiếc số 1 chỉ có mình Tr/Uy Hiệp phải gồng liên tiếp 5,6 ngày mà không được thay thế, kể cũng căng thật !.

 Tất cả chúng ta là NHÀ BINH, luôn thi hành trước, khiếu nại sau ..nhưng bao năm bay bổng có nghe ai khiếu nại điều gì bao giờ đâu ?!,  trái lại tuổi trẻ lúc nào cũng vui và mau quên, ngày nào không bay thì buồn so.

Sau phi vụ đó tôi cũng thắc mắc tại sao lại thả 2 tên VC xanh xao, về lại vùng địch chiếm làm quái gì ? . Briefings cũng cho biết nếu 2 tên VC này tìm cách trở về được thì coi như mission thất bại ? Lạ thiệt !

Sau 25 năm những hồ sơ Top Confidential của Mỹ đã được bạch hóa. Phi vụ đã gần 40 năm rồi, mong các NT và các bạn có mặt hôm đó, nếu biết rõ chi tiết, xin bạch hoá cho anh em biết thêm để hết ..thắc mắc !

KbDq`

Toi bay gio moi biet ro nhung dien tien xay ra trong thoi gian do. Nhung ngay dau cua Biet Doi, toi duoc cu dan BD ra biet phai Hue,( khi do PD moi ve Nha Trang). Khi PD ra Hue duoc may ngay BD duoc mot vi Chi Huy cua SCT moi di hop ve Phi Vu nay, va buoi toi ho con dua anh em di dai an o Quan Com Am Phu. Khi do toi thuong chon bay voi Hoanh copil, DM Sanh Mevo va ??? gunner (Man nho cho them chi tiet nay nhe, Khi con bay H34, Man thuong di Mevo cho toi). Nhung chua thi hanh phi vu nay, toi duoc Nha Trang danh dien ra phai ve gap trinh dien de roi PD va cu mot BDT khac ra thay the.

Khi ve toi Nha Trang toi duoc Th/T Pho cap cho mot UH va mot PHD dua ve SGN trinh dien, toi nho luc do Tr/U Le The Hung ngoi copil bay voi toi ve SGN de sau do se mang may bay tro lai Nha Trang. Neu toi khong nho lam thi Long Co ngoi thung de khi ve bay voi Hung, Mevo la DM Sanh).  Hung sau da anh dung hy sinh o tran Ban Me Thuot, Hiep va 6 nguoi nua hy sinh o Phi Bai, Toi cung da den Tu Si Duong o TSN niem huong cho anh em khi do. Phuc,  Hoanh va Anh toi co dip gap o Houston vao dip Dem Khong Gian o Houston vao nhung nam 2004,5...Nam 2004? toi co dip ghe Little Saigon gap Quynh, Tung, Manh, va ???. Va ve sau toi thuong gap Man va cac KBs khac o VN. Toi roi PD vao giua nam 1972, va khoang 3 nam sau chot toi da thuyen chuyen qua 4 PD nhu 221 o BH, 243 o PC, 233 o DN va sau cung la 245 o BH, nhung khong noi nao toi co cam nghi "belonged" nhu o PD 219.  

Toi van thac mac ve phi vu do, nay duoc Phuc ke lai toi moi biet ro duoc. Cam on Phuc, Quynh. Va nho do ma toi oi nho ra nhung anh em bay chung trong Biet Doi cua toi thoi ky do. Day la mot cau toi trich tu Website MACSOG cua LLDB/Hoa Ky ma toi muon chia se  voi anh em 219 va NKT:

You have never lived until you have almost died.
For those who fight for it, life has a flavor that the protected will never know!

NTDzu~ng

Trung Uy Hoang Nhu Ba DCT68/NKT
Phi vu. na`y dung` dde^? tha` mo^t Toa'n cua? chu*o*ng trinh` De^` Tha'm(nha^n vie^n chie^u ho^`i) cua? Doa`n Cong Tac' 68.De^? la^'y tin tu*'c ddo^`ng tho*`i dda'nh da^'u nhu*~ng khu vu*c ddo'ng qua^n cua? ddich cho ma'y bay oanh kich'.Chu*' kho^ng pha?i tha? VC ve^` ru*`ng.Nho*` Hoa` noi' lai cho ca'c anh be^n 219 hie^?u ro? ho*n,xin ddu*`ng hie^?u la^`m...to^i. nghie^p cho nhu*~ng chie^'n si? chie^u ho^`i vo^ danh, tha^`m la*ng hy sinh cho Nha Ky? Thua^t.                                                                                                                 
                                                                                                         Hoa`ng nhu* Ba' 

VIET-NAM WAR,MICROSID,TROOP MOVEMENT SENSOR

Operation NIAGARA

by Peter Brush

By late January 1968, American intelligence sources detected the presence of 20,000 or more North Vietnamese soldiers in the vicinity of Khe Sanh. 1 American tactics were to allow the enemy to surround the 26th Marine Regiment (Reinforced) at Khe Sanh, to mass their forces, to reveal troop formations and logistic routes, to establish storage and assembly areas, and to prepare siege works. The result would be the most spectacular targets of the Vietnam War for American firepower. 2

General William C. Westmoreland, commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam, chose the code name Operation NIAGARA for the coordination of available firepower at Khe Sanh. According to Westmoreland, the name NIAGARA invoked an appropriate image of cascading shells and bombs.3 NIAGARA would be composed of two elements. NIAGARA I was an comprehensive intelligence-gathering effort to pinpoint the available targets, while NIAGARA II was the coordinated shelling and bombing of these targets with all available air and artillery assets.

The efficacy of the firepower available to the Marines at Khe Sanh was a function of the accuracy of the target selection processes. The intelligence section (S-2) of the 26th Marine Regimental headquarters company was tasked with the responsibility of acquiring targets. S-2 had knowledge of the siege strategy employed by the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 and Con Thien in 1967. These historical lessons were used to predict the behavior of the enemy at Khe Sanh.

Various sources were utilized to develop a view of enemy activity around the Khe Sanh plateau. Sources external to the immediate battlefield included intelligence reports from the Military Assistance Command (MACV) in Saigon, III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF) headquarters in Da Nang, as well as the headquarters of the 3d Marine Division at Phu Bai.

Intelligence was generated locally via a variety of means. Hundreds of acoustic and seismic sensors were seeded around the combat base. This comprehensive sensor system cost approximately a billion dollars and was credited with reducing the number of Marine deaths sustained during the fighting by fully fifty per cent. 4 By Marine estimates, forty percent of the raw intelligence obtained at Khe Sanh was provided by the sensor system. 5 Ground and aerial observers provided visual evidence of enemy activity, as did photo reconnaissance. Crater analyses from incoming rocket, mortar, and artillery rounds were conducted to determine the likely source of the attacks. Shell/flash reports yielded additional targets. Infrared imagery and analysis of intercepted enemy communications were also used.

Marine reconnaissance patrols, Army Special Forces, Central Intelligence Agency personnel, and the MACV Studies and Observation Group (SOG) all provided input to the 26th Marines S-2. The CIA Joint Technical Advisory Detachment and SOG obtained their information from casual encounters from villagers; from regular paid agents, including Rhade and Bru Montagnards, and from locals who desired being hired as agents of the U.S. intelligence community around Khe Sanh.

Likely or confirmed targets were then attacked by the firepower available to the Marines at Khe Sanh. It was the base Fire Support Coordinating Center (FSCC) that was responsible for coordinating the array of supporting arms.

After making the trip down the Ho Chi Minh Trail through Laos, the North Vietnamese established various forward logistic bases within a few thousand meters of the combat base. During periods of darkness the Communists dug shallow trenches leading from their supply points toward the U.S. positions. American intelligence noticed this trenching system around February 23, 1968. Once the trenching system had been constructed close to the base, secondary trench lines branched off and paralleled the Marine perimeter. These close-in, secondary trenches were constructed for the purpose of launching ground attacks against the base.

Initial FSCC fire tactics were to saturate infiltration routes into the area around the combat base with artillery fire and air strikes. These fires slowed down NVA trenching efforts, but were unable to halt them completely. From a logistic standpoint, it was impossible to deliver sufficient munitions to saturate the trenching systems with massed artillery fire. Consequently, the FSCC altered its tactics. The NVA were permitted to construct their trench systems close to the base in order to simplify pin-pointing and killing them with supporting arms.

The sensor system quickly proved its worth. During the night of February 3-4, the sensor arrays indicated the presence of up to 2,000 North Vietnamese soldiers in the vicinity of Marine hill outposts northwest of the combat base. Defensive artillery fires were ordered against these troop concentrations. Sensor monitors reported hearing men screaming in panic and the sounds of troops fleeing their assembly areas. The NVA units were completely destroyed in their assembly areas and the intended attack was effectively broken up. This incident is one of the earliest examples in warfare of a ground attack entirely thwarted on the basis of remote sensor data. 6

By crater analysis, it was possible to confirm locations that were suspected based on other intelligence sources; detect the presence and location of enemy batteries; assist in counterbattery fires; and detect the presence of new types of enemy weapons, new calibers, or new munitions. The direction of flight of a projectile can be determined with reasonable accuracy from its crater, ricochet furrow, or, in the case of dud rounds, soil tunnel.

The particular characteristics of the soil at Khe Sanh often yielded valuable information from crater analysis techniques. A stick placed in the clay soil tunnel made by a dud round would point in the direction of origin, and the angle of the stick indicated the angle of fall. By measuring this angle and using the firing tables of enemy weapons types, counterfire personnel were able to compute the range of the enemy weapon. Inspections of shelled areas were made as soon as possible after the shelling.

Staff Sergeant Bossiz Harris, the acting gunnery sergeant of Mortar Battery, 1st Battalion, 13th Marines, was known to conduct crater analyses during incoming fire. This allowed the 1st Battalion, 13th Marine Fire Direction Center (FDC) to direct prompt return fire. Rapid and accurate counterbattery fire could force the enemy artillerymen to seek cover from American incoming, thereby curtailing their fire mission, as well as destroying NVA guns and gun crews.

In order to minimize the reaction time of the Marine and Army artillerymen at Khe Sanh, Colonel Lownds periodically entered the regimental FSCC bunker, indicated a spot on the wall map, and directed the senior artillery officer to hit the marked spot. The coordinates were sent to the FDC, computed, and sent to the appropriate gun crew, who adjusted their tubes. This aiming process usually took less than forty seconds before a round was on its way. During the battle, 1st Battalion, 13th Marine guns fired 158,891 mixed artillery rounds in direct support of the 26th Marines at Khe Sanh. 7

Acquiring data on enemy troop locations was one thing; giving that data a correct interpretation was quite another. On the first day of the 1968 Tet Offensive, intelligence analysts on the MACV staff received a set of infrared imagery photos. This information was interpreted as indicating NVA troop movements away from the combat base. Analysts examining sensor readout data concluded these troops were closing in on the base in preparation for a massive attack. In actuality, no enemy ground attacks were launched around Khe Sanh during this period.

Shortly after the beginning of the Tet Offensive, aerial reconnaissance and communications intelligence indicated the existence of a major target in the Khe Sanh TAOR. Photo analysts spotted a bank of radio antennas at a limestone cave complex in the DMZ northwest of Khe Sanh. Radio signals emanating from this group of caves showed it to be a major enemy headquarters. There was speculation that North Vietnamese Minister of Defense Vo Nguyen Giap himself was personally supervising the battlefield from this location. Repeated B-52 attacks by the U.S. Seventh Air Force were launched against the cave complex. These actions knocked the enemy radio system off the air temporarily and even managed to seal the cave entrance with rocks and other debris. In spite of these attacks, the cave complex headquarters remained in operation for several weeks. 8

One Marine spotter on Hill 881 South, Lance Corporal Molimao Niuatoa, was gifted with especially sharp vision. Niuatoa was scanning the landscape with a pair of 20-power naval binoculars when he noted the muzzle flash of a NVA artillery piece firing from a distance of 12,000 to 13,000 meters from his position. The location was noted by the spotter. As this gun position was beyond the range of Marine artillery, it could only be taken out with air strikes. An observation aircraft was directed into the general vicinity. This observer did not know the exact location of the gun and so fired a 2.75-inch smoke rocket in the general vicinity of the target. A Marine A-4 Skyhawk jet dropped a 500-pound bomb on the marking rocket. Niuatoa adjusted by noting the location of the billowing bomb smoke in relation to the artillery piece and called in corrections to the spotter aircraft. More smoke rockets were fired and additional strings of bombs were dropped. These corrections and bracketing continued until a Skyhawk on its fourth pass scored a direct hit on the gun position, yielding a series of secondary explosions 9

After 1965, air power in South Vietnam was deployed to extend and compliment the effectiveness of field artillery. Although the 26th Marines possessed thirty artillery pieces as well as tanks and recoilless rifles, the fact that the base could only be supplied by air placed limits on the Marines' ability to saturate the Khe Sanh area with artillery-delivered munitions. It was airpower that would elevate the flood of firepower to Niagara-sized dimensions.

Khe Sanh had top-priority claim on all U.S. air assets in Southeast Asia. B-52s, personally directed by General Westmoreland from the Saigon MACV combat operations center, came from Guam, Thailand, and Okinawa. The Marines and U.S. Air Force provided fighter-bomber support from bases within South Vietnam. Naval aviators from Task Force 77 flew sorties from aircraft carriers in the South China Sea. The South Vietnamese Air Force and U.S. Army aviation also provided aerial support. From B-52s, originally designed as high-altitude strategic bombers for the delivery of nuclear weapons, to propeller-driven A-1 Skyraiders, the entire spectrum of American fixed-wing and rotary aircraft were deployed to support the 26th Marine Regiment at Khe Sanh.

Air representatives worked with their artillery counterparts in the Fire Support Coordination Center. Requests for air support were channeled through the Tactical Air Direction Center of the 1st Marine Air Wing (1st MAW) at Da Nang. If the 1st MAW could not fill a quota, liaison teams from other services were called upon for their support. The priority for air support was so high that at times the sky over Khe Sanh resembled "a giant beehive." 10 Upon arrival, aircraft were normally directed into a holding pattern until a ground controller or ground radar operator was free to direct the strike. Often these patterns extended upward to 35,000 feet with dozens of aircraft gradually corkscrewing their way downward as each flight delivered its ordnance and departed Khe Sanh airspace. A pilot might be directed to a succession of holding points only to end up with his fuel expended and his full load of ordnance still on board. If the pilot ran out of fuel before his turn came to deliver a strike, he was forced to jettison his bombs and return to base.

The contribution of U.S. Navy aviation reflected events in North Vietnam. Clouds that enveloped North Vietnam airspace forced a reduction in the number of Navy sorties there and the released planes and munitions were re-directed against targets around Khe Sanh. In February, about seventy-seven percent of Navy carrier sorties planned against North Vietnam were altered in this manner. One naval aviator who attacked the NVA trench system described the detonation of his 1,000-pound delayed action bomb as resembling the eruption of volcanoes. After collapsing fifty meters of trench, the NVA abandoned the building of assault positions in this area. 11

Close air support was employed against pinpoint targets in proximity of friendly troops. Usually there were fighter-bombers overhead at Khe Sanh around the clock. Tactical air controllers in light airplanes or helicopters maintained communications between strike pilots and troops on the ground. The tactical controller made a marking run by firing a smoke rocket or throwing a colored smoke grenade at the target to be attacked. When the strike pilot saw the smoke, dummy passes were made until the controller was satisfied the jets were lined up on the proper target. Bombing runs were executed and short corrections were made via radio until all ordnance was expended. The tactical air controller would then fly over the target to record the effectiveness of the strike. Battle Damage Assessments were relayed to the departing aircraft for intelligence debriefings upon return to base.

Ground-controlled radar bombing was employed in periods when the target could not be acquired due to bad weather. Radar controllers operated from a heavily reinforced bunker which contained fragile computer equipment and the TPQ-10 radar used to guide aircraft to their target. This radar emitted a beam which locked onto the aircraft. Using targeting data acquired from the FSCC, the controller programmed the computer with information on enemy position, ballistic characteristics of the ordnance, wind speed and direction, and other relevant data. At a predetermined release point, the controller instructed the pilot when to release his bombs. In specially-equipped aircraft such as the twin-engine Marine A-6 Intruder, the bombs could be released automatically by the ground controller. Marine controllers routinely directed strikes as close as 500 meters from friendly positions. The Air Force liaison officer felt strikes could be conducted to within fifty meters in case of emergency. 12 Marine air flew 7,078 sorties and delivered 17,015 tons of ordnance in defense of Khe Sanh, while the U.S. Air Force tactical aircraft contributed 9,691 sorties and 14,223 tons of munitions. 13

The most spectacular display of aerial power at Khe Sanh was provided by the B-52 Stratofortresses. With a payload of 108 500-pound bombs per plane, these Arc Light strikes were conducted against area targets such as troop concentrations, supply areas, and bunker complexes. These targets were programmed into on-board computers and were launched from altitudes above 30,000 feet. Arc Light bombing procedures were based on a grid system, with each block in the NIAGARA area represented by a one by two kilometer box superimposed on a map. Three B-52s, composing one cell, could effectively blanket such a box with high explosives. On average, every ninety minutes one three-plane cell of B-52s would arrive on location around Khe Sanh and be directed to a particular target by a controller. Several flights of B-52s could churn up boxes of terrain several thousand meters long. Many enemy casualties were sustained from concussion alone. In some instances, NVA soldiers were found after an Arc Light strike wandering around in a daze with blood streaming from their noses and mouths. To catch these stunned survivors above ground, artillerymen at Khe Sanh often placed massed artillery fire into the Arc Light target area ten to fifteen minutes after the departure of the heavy bombers.

Arc Light attacks delivered a total of 59,542 tons of munitions from 2,548 sorties during the siege. 14 General Westmoreland was elated at the performance of B-52s, going so far as to maintain that the battle of Khe Sanh was won by the officers and men of the 3d Air Division (B-52). According to Westmoreland, the thing that broke the backs of the NVA at Khe Sanh was "basically the fire of the B-52's." 15

This high praise notwithstanding, Arc Light attacks had some limitations. A North Vietnamese soldier captured in April 1968, told his interrogators that his unit received frequent, timely, and accurate warnings of impending B-52 attacks. These alerts came either by radio or telephone and usually provided two hours' notice, sufficient for the NVA to depart the planned strike area. The NVA prisoner was not certain as to the origin of these warnings. Possibilities include Soviet intelligence-gathering trawlers operating in the Pacific and the interception of communications sent to or from the MACV combat operations center at Tan Son Nhut air base near Saigon. 16

The Target Intelligence Officer at Khe Sanh, Captain Mizra M. Baig, felt that Arc Lights were an accurate weapon which could be employed around Khe Sanh much the same as other supporting arms. However, since requests for B-52 strikes were submitted fifteen hours prior to the drop, Arc Lights could never be as responsive or flexible as tactical air and artillery. Techniques were developed by the FSCC to combine and compliment the strengths of aerial and artillery support. One such technique was the Mini-Arc Light.

When intelligence data indicated the presence of NVA units in a certain region, the FSCC computed a 500 by 1,000 meter box in the center of the suspected assembly area or likely route of movement. Two A-6 Intruders, each armed with twenty-eight 500-pound bombs, were placed on station. Army 175mm guns at the nearby artillery bases at Camp Carroll and the Rockpile initiated the Mini-Arc Light by pouring sixty 150-pound rounds into one half of the block. Thirty seconds later the A-6s unloaded their ordnance in the middle of the block. At the same time, the artillery at Khe Sanh poured an additional two hundred artillery and mortar rounds into the target area. Fire coordination was such that bombs and artillery shells hit at the same instant. When properly saturated with munitions, enemy soldiers caught in the zone "simply ceased to exist." 17

The Mini-Arc Light could be put into effect in about 45 minutes. To reduce reaction time even further, a Micro-Arc Light was executed. The block size was reduced to 500 by 500 meters. Any aircraft on station could be used for bombing. The Micro could be planned and executed within ten minutes. Twelve to sixteen 500-pound bombs, thirty 175mm artillery rounds, and 100 mixed lighter artillery rounds from Khe Sanh batteries could be unloaded on the target block within ten minutes. On an average night, three to four Minis and six to eight Micros were executed in the vicinity of the Khe Sanh Combat Base. 18

Because the Marines at Khe Sanh were surrounded by North Vietnamese, the base could neither be supplied nor evacuated by ground operations. Consequently, an effective method of aerial resupply was vital to the continued existence of the base. The principal source for supplies destined for Khe Sanh was Da Nang, a thirty minute flight. C-130s and C-123s provided the bulk of the supplies. Transport crews used speed offloading techniques to minimize the time they spent on the ground at Khe Sanh. When weather or hostile fire prevented transport aircraft from actually landing at the airstrip, parachute and various cargo extraction systems were employed to permit the unloading of cargo without putting the planes' wheels on the ground.

The Marine hill outposts, originally supplied from the base at Khe Sanh at the beginning of the siege, were thereafter served by externally-loaded helicopters flying from the Marine base at Dong Ha. Air Force and Marine crews en route to Khe Sanh flew the last few miles through a wall of enemy anti-aircraft fire - maintenance men at Da Nang noted 242 holes in one C-130 before they gave up counting. 19

As tactical air supported the Marines on the ground, so too did it accompany transport aircraft on their supply missions into the Khe Sanh TAOR. North Vietnamese antiaircraft guns in calibers up to 37mm were dug into the hills around Khe Sanh and menaced the existence of the aerial highway leading to the base. By March, the danger from enemy fire was so acute that all transports were provided with tactical air escorts. Air planners drew on their maps a line indicating the flight path of a cargo plane from the time it dropped below 3,500 feet above ground until it regained that altitude after disgorging its cargo. The potential danger area from which a 37mm gun could hit a plane was calculated. Fighter bombers were directed against known or potential enemy gun positions using 20mm cannon and fragmentation bombs. These attack runs commenced when the cargo planes reached an elevation of 1,500 feet above the ground.

In clear weather, two fighters laid down smoke screens for concealment on both sides of the flight path of the incoming transports. During the siege, every 37mm gun emplacement was repeatedly attacked until intelligence showed the gun to be destroyed or abandoned. More than 300 antiaircraft sites were reportedly destroyed. 20 When considered necessary, Air Force F-4 Phantoms equipped with cannon were kept in the area to provide combat air patrols to disincline the North Vietnamese Air Force from intervening in the fighting around Khe Sanh. Carrier-based aircraft bombed airfields in North Vietnam that short range enemy MiGs would have had to use to attack the Marine positions.

General Westmoreland was certain the North Vietnamese intended to overrun the Marine base at Khe Sanh as they had done at Dien Bien Phu. If so, air power was instrumental in denying victory to the Communist forces. Weather and other considerations prevented accurate measurement of the damage sustained by enemy forces from Operation NIAGARA. Photo reconnaissance and direct visual observation credited NIAGARA forces with causing 4,705 secondary explosions, 1,288 enemy killed, 1,061 structures destroyed, 158 damaged, 891 bunkers destroyed, 99 damaged, 253 trucks destroyed, and 52 damaged. Enemy personnel losses were estimates; they could not be confirmed since an actual body count was not possible. Westmoreland's Systems Analysis Office produced four models from which its analysts concluded that total NVA casualties - killed and wounded seriously enough to require evacuation - numbered between 9,800 and 13,000 men. The generally cited figure of 10,000 casualties represents half the number of NVA believed committed to attacking the Khe Sanh Combat Base at the beginning of the fighting there. 10,000 casualties represents fifty-nine percent of the number of enemy killed in all of I Corps during the 1968 Tet Offensive. 21

The one billion dollars worth of aerial munitions expended by the U.S. during the siege totaled almost 100,000 tons. That amount equaled almost 1,300 tons of bombs dropped daily, and represents an expenditure of five tons for every one of the 20,000 NVA soldiers initially estimated to be committed to the fighting at Khe Sanh. 22 This expenditure of aerial munitions dwarfs the amount of munitions delivered by artillery, which totals eight shells per enemy soldier believed to have been on the battlefield.

General Giap claimed Khe Sanh was never of particular importance to the North Vietnamese. According to Giap, it was the U.S. that made Khe Sanh important because the Americans had placed their prestige at stake there. 23 In the larger scheme of things, the fighting at Khe Sanh was of little lasting significance. Before the bombs and shells of Operation NIAGARA stopped falling on the Khe Sanh battlefield, U. S. President Johnson ordered severe restrictions on aerial and naval attacks against North Vietnam, declared the readiness of the U.S. to begin peace discussions to end the war, and declined to seek reelection to the presidency. In June 1968, the base at Khe Sanh was abandoned by the Americans. Ultimately, the U.S. would learn that it was unable to win at the conference table what it could not win on the battlefield.
 

AN/GSQ-187 Remote Battlefield Sensor System (REMBASS)
AN/GSQ-187 Improved Remote Battlefield Sensor System (IREMBASS)

The Remotely Monitorer Battlefield Sensor System (REMBASS) and Improved REMBASS (I-REMBASS) contain passive sensors that, once emplaced, can be unattended for up to 30 days. The sensors are normally in an idle mode with very low power dissipation. When a target comes into detection range, the sensors note a change in the ambient energy level (seismic/acoustic, thermal, and/or magnetic), and are activated. The sensors identify the target (as a person or a tracked or wheeled vehicle), format this information into short digital messages, and transmit the messages to a monitoring device (either the SMS, the PMS or M/P). Information received at the monitoring device is decoded and displayed, showing target classification and direction of travel. The sensors send a test message on initial power-up to verify operational status. The repeaters send periodic test messages. Operator calculations, based upon the sensor data, can be used to determine target location, speed, direction of travel, and number of targets.
I-REMBASS is a downsized version of the originally fielded REMBASS. The history of I-REMBASS dates to the Vietnam War, when a system called Unattended Ground Sensor System (UGSS) was used to detect enemy troop movement. The UGSS was the first generation of what is today called, the I-REMBASS. In 1982 the immediate predessor of I-REMBASS, which was REMBASS, became a fielded system.

REMBASS

REMBASS is a ground-based, all-weather, day-and-night, battlefield surveillance, target development, and early warning system capable of remote operation under field conditions. The basic purpose of REMBASS is to detect, locate, classify, and report personnel and vehicular (wheeled and tracked) activities in real-time within the area of deployment. With a meteorological sensor attached, it will also sense and collect weather information. It uses remotely monitored sensors emplaced along likely enemy avenues of approach. These sensors respond to seismic-acoustic energy, infrared energy, and magnetic field changes to detect enemy activities. The sensors process the data and provide detection of classification information which is incorporated into digital messages and transmitted through short burst transmission to the system sensor monitor programmer set. The messages are demodulated, decoded, displayed, and recorded to provide a time-phased record of enemy activity.
This system complements other manned/unmanned surveillance systems such as ground surveillance radar, unmanned aerial vehicles, and night observation devices. The system provides division, brigade, and battalion commanders with information from beyond the forward line of own troops (FLOT), and enhances rear area protection. It can be deployed anywhere in the world in a tactical environment in support of reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) operations. The system consists of eleven major components: a passive infrared (IR) sensor, magnetic (MAG) sensor, seismic/acoustic (SA) sensor, radio repeater. Sensor Monitoring Set (SMS), radio frequency monitor (referred to as portable monitoring set (PMS)) , code programmer, antenna group, power supply, mounting rack, and Sensor Signal Simulator (SSS). A set consists of eight IR sensors, eight MAG sensors, thirty-two SA sensors, eight radio repeaters, one SMS, three PMS, two code programmers, one antenna group, one power supply, one mounting rack, and one SSS.
(1) Magnetic Sensor, DT-561/GSQ. This is a hand-emplaced, MAG sensor. The MAG sensor detects vehicles (tracked or wheeled) and personnel carrying ferrous metal. It also provides information on which to base a count of objects passing through its detection zone and reports their direction of travel relative to its location. The monitor uses two different (MAG and IR) sensors and their identification codes to determine direction of travel.
(2) Seismic Acoustic Sensor, DT-562/GSQ. This is a hand-emplaced SA classifying sensor. It detects targets and classifies them as unknown, wheeled vehicle, tracked vehicle, or personnel.
(3) Passive Infrared Sensor, DT-565/GSQ. This is a hand-emplaced, IR detecting sensor. The sensor detects tracked or wheeled vehicles and personnel. It also provides information on which to base a count of objects passing through its detection zone and reports their direction of travel relative to its location. The monitor uses two different (MAG and IR) sensors and their identification codes to determine direction of travel.
(4) Radio Repeater, RT-1175/GSQ. This is an expendable/recoverable, digital/analog radio repeater used to extend the broadcast range of radio messages from anti-intrusion sensors to a monitoring set. It receives, processes and relays messages from either an anti-intrusion sensor or another like radio repeater. Several repeaters may be used in a station-to-station chain, one sending to another, to relay messages over a long distance.
(5) Sensor Monitoring Set, AN/GSQ-187. The SMS has a dual channel receiver with a permanent hard copy recorder and a temporary visual display (TVD). The SMS receives, processes, displays, and records sensor information relating to 60 sensor ID codes. Detections and classification are displayed as: dashes (-) for unknown targets, (T) for tracked vehicles, (W) for wheeled vehicles, and (P) for personnel. The TVD can simultaneously display up to ten sensor ID codes with detection or classification information. A keyboard allows the operator to program the SMS operation: set radio frequency (RF) channels, establish hard copy recorder format, initiate system operational checks or built in test (BIT), and calculate target speed. A separate display shows the keyboard functions and calculations.
(6) Radio Frequency Monitor, R-2016/GSQ. This is a single-channel PMS with a TVD. The PMS receives, processes, and displays sensor ID codes and detection/classification messages.
(7) Code Programmer, C-10434/GSQ. The programmer is a portable device used to program sensors and repeaters to the desired operating channel, ID code, mission life, arm mode, and gain. It is also used to condition newly installed batteries in sensors and repeaters. It has a built in visual self test to ensure the proper information programmed into the sensor or repeater.
(8) Antenna Group, OE-239/GSQ. The antenna group consists of an omnidirectional unity gain antenna, a mast assembly, a pre-amplifier suitable for mast mounting and an RF multicoupler. It is used with the SMS and the PMS. Up to four monitoring devices can use the antenna group simultaneously.
(9) Power Supply, PP-8080/GSQ. The power supply is a custom flyback-type switching regulator that converts external power sources (24 volts direct current (dc), 115 or 220 volts alternating current) to 12 volts dc nominal prime power. The power supply can be used to power the SMS, repeater or SSS.
(10) Mounting Rack MT-4825/GSQ. The mounting rack is an aluminum angle shock mounted rack. It is used to mount the repeaters in helicopters.
(11) Sensor Signal Simulator (SSS) SM-755/GSQ. The SSS is similar in appearance to the SMS. It has the capability to receive, record, edit, copy, and retransmit an operational scenario involving any two of the 599 REMBASS channels. It also has the capability to transmit pre-recorded scenarios. These functions are accomplished without any additional support equipment. The SSS allows institutional or unit sustainment training in either a classroom or field environment without the use of REMBASS/IREMBASS sensors. The operator can monitor the outputs of the SSS on the PMS or SMS.
(12) Batteries. The sensors and the PMS use BA-5589/U lithium batteries. The repeaters, SMS, and SSS all use BA-5590/U lithium batteries. 

Personnel detectors

See also: Materials MASINT

A Vietnam-era sensor, the XM2, generally known as the "people sniffer", detected ammonia concentrations in air, which indicated the presence of groups of people or animals. While it was sensitive, but not selective for people, many water buffalo became targets. Nevertheless, it was considered the best sensor used by the 9th Infantry Division, because, as opposed to other MASINT and SIGINT sensors, it could give helicopter-borne troops real-time detection of targets ^[1]

Unattended ground sensors

Vietnam-era acoustic MASINT sensors, in the IGLOO WHITE program, included the "Acoubuoy" (36 inches long, 26 pounds)... floated down by camouflaged parachute and caught in the trees, where it hung to listen. The Spikebuoy (66 inches long, 40 pounds) planted itself in the ground like a lawn dart. Only the antenna, which looked like the stalks of weeds, was left showing above ground." ^[2]
These sensors, however, transmitted via relay aircraft to a computer center in Thailand. Their data was used principally for directing airstrikes, rather than alerting ground troops to nearby enemy. 

FORAE programs included:^[16]

• BORDEN, which recruited ordinary NVA prisoners of war and sent them back as minimally trained SOG agents, whom SOG expected to be captured, and make the North suspect there was a resistance movement that these agents were to support.
• URGENCY, in contrast, did not recruit potentially cooperative agents, but sent hard-core PAVN members, convinced of their ideology, back in such a way that the Northern security organization would believe that actually loyal individuals had been turned. In more recent tradecraft, such programs have been called "spay, neuter, and release".
• OODLES, which did not actually send agents into the North, but gave the impression that it was doing so. It would drop personnel parachutes weighted with ice, which would quickly melt, but show the signs to North Vietnamese security of a successful agent drop. Radio transmitters that would send apparently coded messages from agent teams in operation. Also, BORDEN and URGENCY personnel would be told that they were meet with nonexistent OODLES teams, in the hope they would report this to their interrogators.

MACV-SOG NHA KY THUAT
This article breaks the Citizendium naming convention of not using abbreviations, because the Vietnam War U.S. unit MACV-SOG had two meanings, one unclassified, the other classified. The unclassified and nondescript meaning was Military Assistance Command, Vietnam-Studies and Observation Group. The real meaning was Military Assistance Command Vietnam-Special Operations Group, responsible for covert operations against North Vietnam.
At the May 1963 Pacific commanders' conference, decision were made to conduct covert operations. First, of course, there needed to be a unit in Vietnam to carry out these mission. MACV-SOG started to appear on unclassified organizational charts. It was formally established on January 24, 1964. ^[1]
Previous CIA agent programs for the North were gradually moving under MACV control — although SOG always had an Army commander, Air Force deputy commander, and CIA officer in the next highest role. The classified command history states that all operations were joint with South Vietnamese counterparts, generally called Strategic Technical Directorate (Vietnamese: Nha Ky Thuat), although unofficial sources say that MACV-SOG often considered STD as penetrated by North Vietnamese intelligence, and was trusted only to a limited extent. There may have been independent CIA operations working with other Vietnamese groups.
The U.S. had a shortage of covert operators, with Asian experience. in general. ironically, Assistant Secretary of State Roger Hilsman, who had been a guerrilla in Asia during the Second World War, was forced out of office on February 24.^[2] George Ball, with the concurrence of Secretary of State Dean Rusk, took great pride in firing him. ^[3]
It ran operations inside and outside the South. Operations into Cambodia were codenamed SALEM HOUSE (previously DANIEL BOONE),^[4] operations into Laos were PRAIRIE FIRE (previously SHINING BRASS)^[5], NICKEL STEEL actions were in the Demilitarized Zone,^[6] and there were numerous compartments dealing with operations in and against North Vietnam.

SOG's supervision

SOG operations could require incredibly complex approval, up to and including presidential level. ^[7]

SOG's initial organization

The first chief of MACV-SOG was COL Clyde Russell, who had been a WWII paratroop officer who transferred to Special Forces at a rather high rank, and without experience of covert action against targets in enemy areas. Paratroopers do jump behind enemy lines, but assembling into regular units as soon as possible, fighting intensely and overtly, but expecting conventional forces to link up with them within a few days. The first commander of the airborne operations section was a Special Forces lieutenant colonel named Edward Partain, whose experience had been planning guerrilla, not intelligence, networks, behind Soviet lines. ^[8]
Russell faced problems of organizational doctrine as well as military politics. U.S. doctrine for offensive guerrilla operations, then as now but far less developed at the time, called for the formation of a Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force (JUWTF), with components from each of the services. The argument for keeping distinct service identities was better integration with the regular military. Jack Singlaub, to become the third commander of SOG, argued that special operators needed to form their own identity;^[9] while today's United States Special Operations Command has components from all the services, there is a regional Special Operations Component, alongside Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Components, in every geographic Unified Combatant Command. Today, officers from the special operations community have risen to four-star rank, including Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but special operators were regarded as outcasts, unlikely to rise high in rank, during the Vietnam War.

South Vietnamese covert operations

Another challenge was working with the South Vietnamese counterpart of SOG, called the Strategic Technical Directorate (STD).^[10] Originally, SOG was to advise STD in conducting its own operations. In practice, MACV-SOG ran its own operations, sometimes with Vietnamese under its direct command, an exception to the relationships between U.S. and Vietnamese forces. There was considerable, sometimes justifiable, concern that STD may have been penetrated by Communist agents.^[11] Details of STD, some from unofficial sources such as the son of its Vice Director, Colonel Ngo The Linh, are only beginning to become available and the situation is being reassessed. ^[12]
On July 4, the DRV announced that RVN guerrillas attacked in Laos on 27 June and the DRV coast on 30 June. General Nguyen Cao Ky, on July 22, confirms there were raids.^[2]

Building the first operational effort

Not only was there a problem in finding officers with marginally relevant qualifications, the standard tour of duty in Vietnam was one year — about the time it took an officer, inexperienced with this type of covert operation, to gain a reasonable understanding of the mission. Russell, in May 1965, passed command to an unusually well qualified officer, Donald Blackburn. Blackburn, as a junior officer when the Japanese conquered the Philippines, refused to surrender, and built a major and effective guerrilla organization, working well with both Americans and Filipinos. At the end of the war, he was the youngest full colonel in the United States Army, which was not quite sure what to do with a combat-proven 29-year-old colonel. As an indication of the contemporary career dead end that was special operations, twenty years later, he was still a colonel, with the longest time in grade of any colonel in the Army.^[13]
SOG, at this point, had five tightly compartmented operational mission elements targeted against North Vietnam, under the overall code name FOOTBOY; as with any organization, they restructured over time:

• TIMBERWORK: Long- and short-term intelligence agent insertion, with a strategic deception subcompartment known as FORAE
• PLOWMAN: Psychological and paramilitary operations by naval forces
• Other black propaganda, which was usually run by the senior CIA officer, and included such things as the creation of a nonexistent resistance movement in the North, called the Sacred Sword of the Patriots League, which was intended to encourage the expected paranoia of North Vietnamese internal security and send them into chasing phantoms
• SHINING BRASS: cross-borer reconnaissance into Laos, renamed DANIEL BOONE when Cambodian penetrations were authorized
• MIDRIFF: air support for the other three compartments, covertly operating over North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia

Besides MIDRIFF, there were other support elements for special supplies, communications, etc.
While Westmoreland respected Blackburn's combat experience, Westmoreland talked to generals, not colonels. Blackburn was to brief him once during his year of command. In Vietnam, special operators had far lower ranks than was warranted by their responsibilities. For example, the commander of the 5th Special Forces Group controlled irregular troops in the numbers of a regular army division, a command for a two-star major general. The Special Forces group commander was also a colonel. Even today, while special operations has enormously more prestige and specialists can rise to the highest ranks, in a geographical Unified Combatant Command, the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine component commanders are three-star lieutenant generals, while the special operations component commander is a colonel or one-star brigadier general.

Agent and deception operations

According to the original PACOM plan, the purpose of MACV-SOG's Airborne Operations Group designated OP34 agent insertion was to build resistance networks, as opposed to the fictitious Sacred Sword of the Patriots League that was a separate black propaganda operation involving naval operations and clandestine radio. The authorized missions were, through 1966, intelligence collection, sabotage, and psychological warfare. After 1966, sabotage and psychological operations were made secondary to direct reconnaissance on major roads leading to the Ho Chi Minh Trail, as well as establishing civilian contacts for intelligence collection.
With both limited information gathered and a serious concern about compromise, the mission again changed, to the insertion of short-term "strata" special reconnaissance teams. Since no long-term agent team was ever successfully infiltrated and exfiltrated, the short-term surveillance missions were another option. Precisely due to the likelihood of capture and doubling of the long-term teams, another mission, codenamed FORAE, was set up to send deceptive information through unwittingly redoubled agents.
At the end of 1968, therefore, the Airborne Operations Group had three branches:^[14]

• OP34A: agent operations
• OP34B: strata operations
• OP34C: diversionary operations

Deception in the MACV-SOG context differed significantly from Second World War programs of the London Controlling Section (LCS). Those programs were intended to cause specific enemy decisions or actions, rather than just be confused and waste effort, the goal of FORAE. ^[15] Under Plan BODYGUARD, there were a series of LCS operations, all to convince the Germans that the cross-channel invasion would strike anywhere except Normandy. FORTITUDE SOUTH was the deception that the invasion was to cross the English Channel at its narrowest point, and land at the Pas de Calais. This seems to have been accepted by the Germans, and nothing would have been harmed if they decided other deceptive hints, such as FORTITUDE NORTH indicating Norway would be invaded, was seen as a deception. Characteristic of these WWII programs is that they started with a conclusion the LCS wanted the enemy to reach, and then selected means to lead him in the desired direction.
FORAE programs included:^[16]

• BORDEN, which recruited ordinary NVA prisoners of war and sent them back as minimally trained SOG agents, whom SOG expected to be captured, and make the North suspect there was a resistance movement that these agents were to support.
• URGENCY, in contrast, did not recruit potentially cooperative agents, but sent hard-core PAVN members, convinced of their ideology, back in such a way that the Northern security organization would believe that actually loyal individuals had been turned. In more recent tradecraft, such programs have been called "spay, neuter, and release".
• OODLES, which did not actually send agents into the North, but gave the impression that it was doing so. It would drop personnel parachutes weighted with ice, which would quickly melt, but show the signs to North Vietnamese security of a successful agent drop. Radio transmitters that would send apparently coded messages from agent teams in operation. Also, BORDEN and URGENCY personnel would be told that they were meet with nonexistent OODLES teams, in the hope they would report this to their interrogators.

Cross-border reconnaissance

The existence of three units that conducted cross-border reconnaissance, and some direct action has been mentioned much more widely than was MACV-SOG: Special Operations Augmentation Command and Control units. While these were classified programs, the first level of cover implied that they were operations of the 5th Special Forces Group. In reality, they were actually under OP35, the Ground Studies Branch of SOG.^[17]

• North, based in Da Nang, aimed at Laos and North Vietnam.
• Central, based in Kontum, responsible for the triangular meeting of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.
• South, based in Ban Me Thuot and targeted on VC-dominated areas of the South, as well as Cambodia

MACV-SOG carried out special reconnaissance in Laos and Cambodia, in which they were to avoid direct combat; they were there either to collect intelligence for the moderate term, or to give targets to air strikes, especially by B-52 heavy bombers using ARC LIGHT tactics. Under some circumstances, the political situation was such that the penetration could not be compromised.

"If I decide that there’s no way we can effect your rescue [in Cambodia], I’ll order the gunships to fire at you to prevent the enemy from getting their hands on you. I can’t risk having any of the [recon] teams compromised if they take you alive."^[18]

The recon team, in such a situation, might only have choices among bad options. United States Army Special Forces personnel in Southeast Asia have spoken, informally, of unwritten agreements among team members: if they were captured by the enemy, they would rather be killed by friends than go into a long-suffering captivity that might, in any event, be fatal.

Maritime operations

Psychological warfare

MACV-SOG and the Gulf of Tonkin incident

On 9 September 1963, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) approved CINCPAC OPLAN 34-63, which called for MACV and the Central Intelligence Agency (known as CAS), Saigon to provide advice and assistance to the GVN in certain operations against NVN. Phase I of the plan was to consist of "Psychological Operations"; Phase II of "Hit and Run Attacks." The latter included "amphibious raids using Vietnamese UDT/SEAL Team, Rangers, Airborne, and Marine units against selected targets south of the Tonkin Delta having little or no security." Apparently, the plan was not forwarded to the White House by SecDef. ^[19]
While the attacks on the DESOTO patrols were explained as attacks on vessels carrying out free passage, and had not provoked the DRV other than to sail inside its claimed 12 mile limit (the US respected a traditional 3 mile limit, "In fact the United States at the time was carrying out a program of covert naval commando attacks against North Vietnam and had been engaged in this effort since its approval by Johnson in January 1964." ^[20] The NSA report also said the Maddox had first fired warning shots.

DESOTO patrols and naval response

There almost certainly was a North Vietnamese attack, on August 2, on the single-destroyer DESOTO patrol being conducted by the USS Maddox'. It is still unclear if what became known as the Gulf of Tonkin IncidentUSS C. Turner Joy, to join the Maddox. was meant as retaliation for the prior 34A raid, or if they regarded the Maddox as a potential attacker, or simply wanted to increase pressure on the U.S. In any event, the President ordered a second destroyer, the

34-A forces carried out another raid on North Vietnam during the night of August 3/4, when the U.S. destroyers were beginning their run back up the Tonkin Gulf. If Hanoi was responding to the first raid, a second one furnished an equivalent reason to act against the reinforced DeSoto Patrol.^[20]

Gởi các anh em 219.
Tuần rồi gặp KB Quỳnh và KB Khánh tại phỡ QT, Khánh nhắc lại chuyến bay rước toán bị đụng ở Cambốt thật là vui xin kể lại cho anh em nghe coi như chuyện vui cuối tuần.
Kèm đây là bản Raining night in Georgia tặng các bạn để nhắc lại NT Dũng người bạn thân của tôi cũng là hoa tiêu phó của tôi trong chuyến bay đó.
Anh AN bay số 1 tôi số 2  Ngọ số 3. Sau khi anh An đón được nữa toán, phần tôi rước phần toán còn lại. Đang hovering từ trên ngọn cây trong khu rừng rậm và dùng dây
hoist để kéo từng toán viên lên phi cơ; đang khi chăm chú để ráng giữ một chổ để đón cho nhanh thì tôi nghe tiếng .. RẮC.. môt viên đạn xuyên qua nón bay của tôi từ phải sang trái
trúng vào thành sắt cửa hoa tiêu phó dội lại ngững mãnh đạn nhỏ trúng vào mặt của Dũng. Tôi lật đật cắt dây hoist rồi cất cánh, toán Lôi hổ còn lại phải chạy đi tìm bãi đáp khác, tôi
vội báo cho anh An biết là bị bắn rồi nhưng radio của tôi chỉ nghe được mà thôi.  Tôi xoay người lại nhìn Dũng thấy Dũng cứ lấy tay có găng tay và rờ lên mặt để xem có sao
không, tôi hết hồn vì thấy mặt Dũng toàn máu đỏ, tôi lấy tay đập nào đùi của Dũng hói có sao không ? Dũng xoay lại ra dấu OK..Dũng gọi anh An nói là ông Thạnh bị bắn trúng đầu rồi
vì Dũng thấy helmet của tôi có một lổ lớn bị toét ra bên trái. Tôi nghe giọng anh An hét lên : mầy có sao không Thạnh, tôi phải ra dấu cho Dũng trã lời cho anh An là mình OK....
Toán còn lại phải chạy ra đầm nươc là bãi đáp tới. Chiêc anh An đã chở nữa toán, mình phải đón nữa toán còn lại bất cứ giá nào. Chờ cho toán đủ thì giờ chạy ra đầm nước là
mình xuống., nhúng luôn 3 bánh xe trong đầm nuớc để tóan dễ leo lên máy bay, mévo Khánh cứ bảo chờ chút, chờ chút rồi.. lên.. mình kéo lên nhưng máy bay không nhúc nhích gì
hết. Đạp qua đạp lại bổng máy bay vù lên như có ai đẩy thiếu điều overcontrol. Thế là tai qua nạn khỏi, trên đường về Quản Lợi phải nhờ 1 OV10 dẫn về vì tất cả phi cơ đều hư ADF.
Kiểm soát lại thì viên đạn đi vòng sau ót chỉ đốt hết mớ tóc sau ót mà thối. Nếu hồi đó mà là bây giờ thì tôi sẽ nói cám ơn Chúa đã che chỡ.
Nhớ lại những chuyến bay như vậy làm mình càng nhớ lại những bạn đồng đội của mình vào sinh ra tử với nhau.
Tặng N T Dũng vì có công dạy cho tôi bài hát trên trong những lúc rãnh rỗi. Thăm An cào cào flight lead của tôi. Thăm tất cả anh em .

KB Trần ngọc Thạnh

Anh nhac lai ky niem nay lam toi nho toi nhung ngay "Bay trong Lua Dan" ma chung ta tung trai ben nhau.  Toi cung dong gop mot vai hoi uc de nhac lai ky niem nay. 

Luc do vao mua he nam 1970, Chuong trinh Vietnamization duoc Nixon dua ra  va cuoc Hanh Quan vuot bien gioi qua Mien danh vao Mat Khu Mo Vet do Tuong Nguyen Viet Thanh chi huy Quan Doan IV va Mat Khu Luoi Cau do Tuong Do Cao Tri chi huy QD III phoi hop danh vao cac an toan khu cua VC nam tren dat Mien.

Chien truong Mo Vet nam o phia Tay Bac Loc Ninh voi cac mat tran khoc liet o cac khu rung cao su Snoul, Memoy, Damber ... Biet Doi King Bee duoc dua tu Da Nang vao Quan Loi de yem tro cac cuoc hanh quan dac biet cua cac toan Loi Ho nhay vao cuc R hay Trung Uong Cuc Mien Nam cua VC khi do rut tu noi dia VN sang dat Mien that sau thuoc phan Kratie' cach bien gioi Loc Ninh hon mot  tram cay so. Cac H34 duoc lenh BDT la D/U Nguyen Quy An do day 3 ninh xang de thich hop voi doan duong hanh quan xa. (Binh thuong khi di hanh quan o cac vung khac, muc tieu la duong mon HCM cach bien gioi khong xa lam nen thuong do 2 binh hay mot binh ruoi xang de du suc keo tau tu mot bai dap nho vua kich thuoc mot chiec H34 trong rung cay cao.).

Ba chiec King Bees duoc 4 cobras ho tong cat canh tu Loc inh lay cao do nham huong Kratie' o ca do an toan bay qua vung chien tran Snpol con do lua ben duoi. Khi toi vung, Cobey lien lac va keu King Bees lam holding patterns tren cao cho vi toan ben duoi chua tim duoc bai dap va bi dich quan dang san duoi. Covey huong dan cobras oanh kich yem tro de toan di chuyen, nhung sau 10 cover thi cobras cho biet ho phai ve  nhien lieu toi muc gioi han, cuoi cung chi con lai 3 chiec King Bees va Covey tren vung, ben duoi toan dang bi san duoi. D?U An quyet dinh phai rut toan khong chiu ve khong du khong con cobrae yem tro, vi neu khong rut duoc toan thi chac chan dich quan voi so dong (toan bao ve cuc R) se  truy lung suot dem va cac Loi Ho se khong co nhieu co hoi de thoat, va vi khong co bai dap nen se tha hoist xuong keo tung nguoi len. King Bee Lead An check ra lenh cho cac Truong Phi Co check hoist thi chi con chiec thu hai hoist con tot, do la chiec do pilot Thanh Rau va copil Dzung Mevo Khanh/ Lead ra lenh cho so 2 xuong hoist va hai King Bees con lai (so 1 va 3) se dung cay dai lien M60 ban cover thay cho 4 cobras vua bay ve vi thieu xang, voi moi chiec trang bi 2 bo rockets hai ben, dau mui phi co gan minigun va sung ban dan M79 lien tuc duoc, thi hoa luc yem tro that ra chi la phao tep ma thoi.

So 2 nhan lenh bay xuong hover tren dau chim cay, TPC Thanh Rau tha hoit Neo Khanh vua ban yem tro vua nhoai nguoi ra ngoai huong dan day hoist va lien lac intercom voi TPC de dua dau hoist vao dung cho cho toan leo len. Khi do Lead keu may huong dan so 2 phai quay dau ve huong gio de tang do nang, King Bee 2 tu tu quay dau ve huong gio thi nghe tieng mot vat cham manh vao cockpit, Copil Dzung thay ngua ngua o mat, dua tay len chui thi thay mau do dinh vao gants, nhi  qua ben TPC Thanh Rau thi thay helmet co mot lo tro ra, Thanh nhanh tay cat hoist va day can lai toi bay thang ve phia truoc roi lay cao do, Chac anh toan vien dang bamday hoidt bi cat roi xuong dau lam.. Copil bao cao Lead biet TPC so 2 bi ban trung va sau do bao cao tiep ve  tinh trang vo su cua TPC. Lead An ra lenh so 2 vao holding pattern cho Lead va so 3 xuong ban yem tro quan ban. Mot luc sau Lead check voi so 2 co san sang de xuong hoist tiep chua? So 2 cho biet san sang cho lenh xuong. Nhung toan dang bi truy kich nen chua tap hop duoc, nen Lead thay doi ke hoach huong dan toan chay ve phia mot ho nuoc nho gan do de King Bees dap xuong pick up de dang hon. Gan nua tieng sau toan rut ra toi ho, Lead ra lenh cho so 2 va 3 ban dai lien cover va xuong, King Bee Lead o duoi ho nuoc that lau roi moi cat canh, Lead cho biet da lay duoc mot nua toan, va ra lenh so 2 xuong lay nua toan con lai va warning  ve suc hut cua mat nuoc rat kho cat canh, do do Lead moi dau tinh ruoc ca toan, nhung cat canh khong noi nen chi lay duoc nua toan ma thoi, con lai so 2 se ruoc not. So 2 dap xuong, so toan vien con lai len tau, Mevo Khanh bao cao xong, cat canh. Thanh keo pitch len, nhung con tau bi hut chat vao mat nuoc, RPM tuot nhanh, Thanh an van pitch xuong lay lai vong quay RPM, va tang len toi da, hai chan dao rudder cho tau xoay qua xoay lai  roi km throttle keo manh pitch len, con tau boc vot len *Truc thang H34 vong quay RPM chi co the dieu khien manually ma thoi khac voi Huey UH-1co automatic control), Thanh nuong theo da cat canh lay cao do. Lead An lien lac kiem soat su an toan 3 chiec KBs, bao voi Covey King Bees go home. 

Day co le la phi vu ruoc toan dai nhat trong lich su PD 219, o mot muc tieu xa nhat tu Launch Site. Bau troi da nga toi, tren cao do nhin xuong Snoul khoi lua ngap troi, ngoi tren phong lai nhin xuong, thay cac toan vien run lanh vi tham uot nuoc ho bai dap, va hoi kanh tren cao do, nhung ai cung vui vi noi chet da tam roi, de lai noi rung tham xa xoi lam toi lien tuong den tua de cua mot phim ve Chien Tranh thu II, khi quan Dong Minh do bo Au Chau, mot toan biet kich duoc nhay du chiem mot can cau sau trong long dich de bao ve duong tien quan cho thiet giap o phia sau, "A Bridge Too Far!" va buoi chieu hom ay la "A Hot CZ Too Far!".

Bai viet nay tang tat ca cac KBs va rieng tang Anh An, Anh Thanh, Khanh va cac KBs con lai cua 3 chiec ngay hom ay ma nay vi thoi gian ky uc cua toi phai chiu thua. Mot chi tiet trong bai nay theo hoi uc cua toi khac biet mot chut voi Anh Thanh, neu co gi sai sot thi xung la tai thoi gian, cau chuyen nay xay ra da 40 ban truoc roi . Anh Thanh da gan 29 nam roi chua gap, lan chot la dau thap nien 90 o Santa Ana, toi tu Calgary- Canada xuong va Anh Thanh o San Diego (??) len.

NT Dzu~ng

Có vài chi tiết trong bài của anh Dũng  tôi xin được thay đổi. Đó là vào tháng 4/1970, tụi mình là BĐ đầu tiên về nằm ở Trảng Bàng. Lúc đó TT Thiệu chưa thông báo trên đài phát thanh là cho QĐVNCH đánh sang Cambot. Tụi mình làm việc quanh cùng Snoul, Mimot, Kratier, konpong Cham, Konpong Trak. Lúc đó tụi vẹm bỏ chạy để lại đủ thứ. Tôi còn nhớ tụi mình chở kim chích và penicicline về bỏ cả đống cao hơn đầu người tại sân bay Trảng Bàng. Đến đúng May1, 1970 khi TT Thiêu loan báo trên ghát thanh là ra lệnh cho quân đội đánh sang Cambot thì chúng ta quảy gánh về Danang sau khi đã làm việc gầnn tháng trời từ Trảng Bàng.

Hồi đó lúc nào tôi cũng bay chiếc 463 mà tôi vẫn gọi là con trâu già. Đó là loại model C và tôi đã tháo bỏ VHF, LF,Tacan, chỉ giữ lại UHF,ADF và FM nên đuôi rất nhẹ, khi flare không bị tình trạng đuôi chìm và mũi ngỏng lúc ta làm quick stop. Chiếc này tôi bay nó cho tới khi tôi bị thương và nó thì thành tro bụi ở Bù Đóp.

Khi cất cánh từ mặt nước thì không nên chúi ngay cyclic tới trước vì làm như vậy ground cushion sẽ bị tuột ra sau và máy bay khó lên.